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it bears witness. While this may in a measure be determined
by the method of analysis and skill in selection, yet, since the
typical cases selected can only be given to define the basic
principles of the law, it seems that there should be some more
or less elaborate system of notes, by which the finer distinctions
could be indicated, with a reference to cases which while up-
holding the point of the authoritative case, yet support it
with a difference in reasoning. This system is almost entirely
lacking in Mr. Woodruff's book; the individual touch is want-
ing. There has been a great increase in the production of case
books since the case system was taken up by the greater law
schools, but a mere collection of cases under a commofiplace
analysis does not seem to add anything of value to our knowl-
edge of the law. It can only be regarded as a possibly help-
ful tool for a professor in class when he has not yet created
for himself a working system.
NOTES ON RECENT LEADING ARTICLES IN LEGAL
PERIODICALS.
AumucEAN LAw Ruvmw.-June.
The Right of Jury Trial in the Dependencies. James Wilford Garner.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States seem to
decide that the right of trial by jury in the "outlying possessions"
of the United States is not a fundamental right but a matter "which
concerns merely a method of procedure." Mr. Garner does not think
this view coincides with those of the early American or English
commentators, or with the earlier opinions of the Supreme Court
itself. It is only since igoo that the opinion -of the courts seems to
have indicated a change of view. This change, however, has not been
consistent, and when enunciated has been accompanied by an expression
of vigorous dissenting views. Mr. Garner sums up in the concluding
paragraph of his article the views apparently now held by the justices
of the Supreme Court:
"Thus, according to Justice Brown's theory, the right of jury trial
is carried to the Territories only by formal act of extension; according
to Justice White, the same result is accomplished by incorporation, and,
according to his opinion, extension is evidence of incorporation.' In
the Hawaiian Case the two justices stood together, denying the right
of jury trial; in the Alaska Case they united in affirming 'the existence
of the right; but in both cases they reached their conclusions by dif-
ferent lines of reasoning. In the former case Justice Brown, who gave
the opinion of the court, in reality stood with the minority in holding
that Hawaii was an incorporated territory, but he differed with them
in holding that incorporation is not the test of the applicability of the
Constitution. In the Alaska Case, those who had concurred in the
Hawaiian Case, with the exception of Justice Brown, united with
those who had dissented, in upholding the doctrine of extension by
incorporation. Apparently, Justice Brown stands alone in holding
that Congress may deal with the Territories as it pleases, even after
incorporation, until it has seen fit to extend by formal act the pro-
visions of the Constitution to them."
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The Great Usurpation. William Trickett. Mr. Trickett's argument
that the power of the Supreme Court to declare a statute void after it
has passed both houses of Congress and received the approval of the
President is a power which causes a good deal of inconvenience to
persons who have to act on the assumption that such acts are valid,
only to find that the court declares them void, is a reasonable one.
There is a certain amount of inconvenience, perhaps a certain amount
of injustice, arising from such a state of affairs. It may be questioned
whether the evil does not come chiefly because the court, as it seems
inevitably, partakes of the political opinions of the individual members,
and therefore is not always consistent with itself or the law, rather
than from the power itself. Mr. Trickett's contention that the assump-
tion of this power by the Supreme Court is a "usurpation" originated
by Chief Justice Marshall, and accepted by the justices of the Supreme
Court who have succeeded him, is not borne out by the history of the
subject. Chief Justice Marshall did not originate the theory, and
it was one which was familiar to the minds of those who framed the
Constitution of 1787, as a reference to their spoken opinions will show.
James Wilson, in his lectures, and in his speeches before the Penn-
sylvania ratifying convention, spoke of the theory as one accepted, and
a part of the system which the Constitution would put in force. As
he was a leading member of the committee on detail; as the Con-
stitution as submitted to the members of the convention was drawn
up in his handwriting; as he was considered to be the best Con-
stitutional lawyer in the convention, and one of its best debaters,
it is probable that he thoroughly understood that document. There
is abundant other evidence to show that this was the American doc-
trine before the adoption of the Constitution. The Editor of the Law
Review refers to this fact in his note to Mr. Trickett's article.
THE GREEN BAG.-June.
The Closed-Shop Controversy. Charles R. Darling. It is unusual
to meet with an article on this subject which is written in a spirit of
-calm and quiet investigation, apparently ignoring the extreme senti-
ments which have been aroused upon one side or the other. Mr.
Darling asks: "What objection is there, then, to a contract for the
exclusive employment of certain men or a certain class of men?" He
finds, after a short examination, "that if ordinary analogies hold,
the contract for exclusive employment is unobjectionable." He notes
that the principal objections to the validity of the contract' are that
"by means of it men are driven out of employment or forced to join
the unions; that the purpose is to prevent competition by forcing men
into the unions, and to obtain a monopoly of the labor market." The
author thinks that there would never have been any claim that these
objections rendered the contract invalid if it had not been for the
increasing power of the unions, and that it is a subject rather to bedealt with by legislation than by the courts of their own initiative.
He shows that the coercion argument is put in different ways; at one
time it is said that independent workers are forced to join the union;
men are forced to do something against their will; this is coercion and
is unlawful. Another time it is said that they are driven out of employ-
ment and deprived of an opportunity to make a living because they will
not join the unions; this is not lawful because they have a right to
earn their living unmolested. In a very few words, Mr. Darling shows
that if the union has a right to compete for business, the charge of
coercion of any kind has no force. ' When the conduct of the union
is described as an attempt to force men to join the union, the argument
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has a certain plausibility, but its force entirely disappears when
we reflect that the only compulsion used is to compete with them and
thus make it for their advantage to join the unions. As well might it
be said that a tradesman who outstrips his competitor in business,
gets his trade away from him, and then offers him a partnership, is
guilty of forcing the latter into the partnership." Mr. Darling says,
"It is now submitted that a careful analysis of the subject discloses
no element of illegality in the contract for a closed shop." He asks,
"When the courts declare against such contracts do they not simply
infringe without warrant that freedom of contract which is reckoned
among the fundamental rights?"
LAW MAGAZINE AND REvizw.-May.
Responsibility in Law. Rankine Wilson. "It is one of the main
purposes of this treatise to show how the law of England has, in
dealing tenderly with the weak and erring, gone some way to solve
the problem of Responsibility; and to show in what direction its further
solution lies." This is done in an exceedingly philosophic manner,
involving a rdsum6 of psychological science. After, in this way,
finding the groundwork of the mental state of a man, it is said, "It
is difficult to see how the duality of the body and soul, which we have
seen affected in different ways under the processes of perception and
representation, can be overcome except by the working of a higher law-
a higher law which cannot have its source in those factors or elements
which it transcends and unifies; but so soon as we conceive man as a
being endowed with lower faculties in respect of his animal nature,
and with higher faculties in respect of his spiritual nature, the dif-
ficulty vanishes. It is in this fundamental distinction, this division of
the human mind into lower and higher faculties, the one group having
their course in the animal nature, the other in the spiritual, that we
have traced out the psychological and philosophical bases of Responsi-
sibility. When we have come to see that the action of our purely animal
solution of the mystery which has enveloped any definition or satis-
factory explanation of the varying states of responsibility and irrespon-
sibility. When we have come to see that the action of our purely animal
faculties imposes on us no sense of moral responsibility but that of
animal inclinations and instincts; and that the action of our spiritual
faculties, when allowed free scope, control and govern the action of the
lower; we shall come to see that in this freedom of control, by the
higher faculties of the lower, is contained the essential condition of
responsibility!' The subject is to be continued in a later instalment.
Jury Trial and the Federal Constitution. W. C. Dennis. This is a
long and close examination of the subject under discussion, examining
in the course of the argument a great many of the more interesting
cases of recent years, among others the case of Caleb Powers of
Kentucky,--a most decisive case in favor of those who argue that
politics are a factor in court decisions. The article is interesting and
enlightening on many points.
The Province of the Judge and the Jury. G. Glover Alexander. This
is the third part of this very interesting series of historical articles.
This instalment is devoted to Lilburn's Trial in 1649, and shows John
Lilburn, as a "law reformer," to whose ability and sagacity we are
indebted for some very great changes in procedure.
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COLUMBIA LAW RzviEw.-June
An Abused Privilege. W. A. Purrington. The privilege in question
is that which allows a witness to stand mute. Among other objections
to the privilege, the author says: "The privilege, designed as a shield
to the innocent, has proved a handy weapon eagerly seized by unscru-
pulous attorneys and reluctantly availed of by their more conscientious
fellows, whose sense of professional honor, as distinguished from the
other kind, seems to impose upon them the obligation of utilizing
every legitimate, or rather lawful, means for winning the client's cause,
constraining them to raise the objection of privilege, as they plead
the defences of limitation and usury. The climax of the farce-tragedy
comes when murderers and ravishers invoke their victims' privilege to
cover their own guilt, thus forcing courts to construe away the plain
letter of the law in order that its spirit may not be thwarted. And it
is probably not exaggeration to say that few cases can be found in the
reports wherein a plaintiff claiming damages for personal injuries has
invoked this privilege for any other purpose than to conceal what in
honesty should have been made known and what, in so far as it affected
his privacy, he was not at the time to a greater or less extent
exhibiting in the action." Mr. Purrington thinks it desirable that the
statute law on this subject should be so modified that it should not
enable the unscrupulous to suppress in evidence matters which are no
secret outside the courtroom.
Y.ALE LAW JOURNAL.-June.
Conflict of Laws upon the Subject of Marriage and Divorce. Clar-
ence D. Ashley. The Recent Conference on Divorce. Talcott H.
Russell. The Divorce Congress and Suggested Improvements in the
Statutory Law Relating to Divorce. C. La Rue Munson. These three
articles, all devoted to the one subject of divorce, seem to show that
the subject at the present time is attracting an unusual amount of
attention from the legal world. Mr. Ashley's article is short and does
not pretend to do more than give a slight glance at the situation, which
he says "demands some settlement of these intolerable evils." The review
of the recent conference on divorce is still shorter, but it also declares
that the situation is becoming more and more intolerable and that uni-
formity of legislation is called for. Mr. Munson's article is much
longer and goes into the matter with greater detail. The resolutions of
the Divorce Congress are given, with a commentary upon each resolu-
tion. Mr. Munson says: "While this view of the resolutions adopted
by the Congress is but cursory and perhaps confusing, enough will be
gathered to indicate that when they are embodied in the statute laws
of the states a long step forward will have been taken toward remedying
the present divorce evil, not so much by restricting the causes as in
the line of improvement on the question of jurisdiction and procedure."
So at the last there is a gleam of hope in the darkness which is so
deeply felt by the preceding writers.
The Law Relating to Trades Unions. W. P. W. Phillimore. The com-
plaint that the law regarding Trade Unionism is in a chaotic state
has led Mr. Phillinore to "give a brief digest of Trade-Union Law,
leaving the reader to refer to the statutes and decisions for details."
A Trade Union was at first decided to be unlawful. This disability is
now removed, "and no member of a Trade Union is liable to criminal
prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise, and no agreement or trust
is void or voidable on the ground of its being in restraint of trade."
This, of course, is by statute in England. The digest is clearly made
and leaves the subject well defined.
